We study two classes of over-the-counter markets specified by systems of ODE's, in the spirit of Duffie-Gârleanu-Pedersen [6] . We first compute the steady states for many of these ODE's. Then we obtain the prices at which investors trade with each other at these steady states. Finally, we study the stability of the solutions of these ODE's.
1. Introduction. This article addresses the question of equilibrium price formation and stability in relatively opaque over-the-counter (OTC) markets with several traded assets. The financial crisis of 2008 brought significant concerns regarding the rôle of OTC markets, particularly from the viewpoint of global financial stability. Darrell Duffie's recent monograph, Dark Markets (see Duffie [5] ), documents some of the modelling efforts done to understand the effects of illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. Duffie also notes that this area is still underdeveloped in comparison with the vast literature available on central market mechanisms.
Our goal is to shed some light on foundational issues in asset pricing in OTC markets with several assets. In particular, we study models of OTC markets described by ODE's which happen to have a financial market (time invariant) equilibrium (that is, a steady state). In doing so, we are lead to ODE's which have not yet appeared in the differential equations literature. For the specialists in financial economics, it is well known that in OTC markets, an investor who wishes to sell must search for a buyer, incurring opportunity and other costs until one is found (see for instance Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] ). For the case of one asset, the evolution of an investor's state can be described by a system of four quadratic differential equations, an overview is given in Chapter 4 of Duffie [5] . There the author develops a search-theoretic model of the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns, under the hypothesis that the eagerness of the investors are the same whether they have the asset or not. Here we study the more general case with several assets for two classes of extended models which are still described by systems of quadratic differential equations, but without the particular hypothesis. One should notice that without changes of positions the system would stop after a finite time and the market would become inefficient.
For the first extended model, we do not track the particular asset an investor wants to buy when she enters the market (it is called the nonsegmented model/case); but the frequency at which she enters the market depends on that asset. For the second model, we do keep track of the asset an investor intend to purchase (it is called the partially-segmented model/case). In both of our cases the quantities of each asset do not have to be the same. Here we study these two classes of markets in the spirit of Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] . When there is only one traded asset, as in DGP, the two cases collapse to the same model. Unlike, DGP, we do not assume that the investors' eagerness are the same whether they own the asset or not. The departure from this assumption in DGP requires us to use techniques from the theory of dynamical systems.
In such a framework, the first thing we need to show is the existence of a steady state (this steady state is designated, in the financial literature, by the equilibrium (time-invariant) cross-sectional variation in the distribution of ownership). To gain insights on these systems out of equilibrium, we also show that each of our systems is asymptotically stable for any given number of assets in the case of non-segmented markets and for (one and) two assets in the case of partially segmented markets. We show the latter using the old criterion of Routh-Hurwitz (see, for instance, Dorf and Bishop [3] ). The criterion gets very steeply more difficult to handle as we increase the number of assets. (See also Grasselli and Costa Lima [8] for another example of the use of this criterion in a financial context.)
In Section 2, we describe our two classes of models. In Section 3.1, we show the existence of a steady steate and compute it explicitly for the nonsegmented case for any given number of assets. In Section 3.2, we do the same for the case of partially-segmented markets with two assets. Then in Section 4, we obtain the prices on which the investors agreed and we give numerical exmples in section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we study the asymptotic stability of our systems.
2. Two classes of models. Duffie [5] and Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] present their model of OTC market with one traded asset as a system of four linear ODE's with two constraints which can be reduced to a system of two differential equations with two constraints. In this section, we describe two extensions of their model involving K ≥ 1 assets. Before describing each model in details, we would like to set up a few general definitions.
The set of available assets will be denoted I = {1, ..., K}. Investors can hold at most one unit of any asset i ∈ I and cannot short-sell. Time is treated continuously and runs forever. The market is populated by a continuum of investors. At each time, an investor is characterized by whether he owns the i-th asset or not, and by an intrinsic type which is either a 'high' or a 'low' liquidity state. Our interpretation of liquidity state is the same as in Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] . For example, a low-type investor who owns an asset may have a need for cash and thus wants to liquidate his position. A high-type investor who does not own an asset may want to buy the asset if he has enough cash. Through time, investors' ownerships will switch randomly because of meetings leading to trades, at a rate λ i , and the investor's intrinsic type will change independently via an autonomous movement. This dynamics of investor's type change is modeled by a (nonhomogeneous) continuous-time Markov chain Z(t) on the finite set of states E. This set E will be described in more details in each one of the following subsections since it depends on the model.
At any given time t, let µ t (z) denote the proportion of investors in state z ∈ E, i.e. for each t ≥ 0, µ t is a probability law on E.
Let m i denote the proportion of asset i, for all i ∈ I.
2.1. Non-segmented markets. In this simpler model, we recall that we do not track the particular asset an investor wants to buy when entering the market. Let l and h denote respectively a low liquidity and a high liquidity type and let o and n denote respectively whether an investor owns or does not own an asset. Then, the set of investors' states is fully described as follows:
As we said earlier, we do not assume the eagerness of investors is the same when they own the asset and when they don't. For investors not-owning an asset, let us denote the switching intensity from low-type to high-type by γ u and conversely the switching intensity from high-type to low-type by γ d . For investors owning asset i, we will denote the switching intensity from low-type to high-type by γ ui and conversely the switching intensity from high-type to low-type by γ di . In addition, investors meet each other at rate λ i , and an exchange of the asset occurs when an investor of type (li, o) (owns asset i but has a low liquidity state) meets one of type (h, n) (does not own an asset but has a high interest for acquiring one).
Hence, the dynamical system describing the evolution of the proportions of investors in a given state is the following system of 2K + 2 equations with K + 1 constraints for µ t (z) for each z ∈ E:
with the constraints
This is a first generalized version of the system described in Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] .
A schematic of the dynamics between investors for this class of market with two assets is illustrated on Figure 1 .
Since equation (2) and equation set (3) can be eliminated respectively by adding (2) to (1) and by adding each equation of (4) to (3), the initial system described by a set of 2 + 2K equations is reduced to the following set of 1 + K equations:
with the 1 + K constraints
Note that in the first set of constraints, m i is the fraction of the investors' population holding the i-th asset, with i∈I m i < 1. The second constraint is the investors' proportions normalisation. Moreover, since all parameters are positive, a minus sign in the system means an exit from the state and a positive sign means an entry in the state.
The system (5) is the Master Equation. It is non-linear but there is nevertheless for each initial law µ 0 a probability law P µ 0 on the pure jump Figure 1 trajectories Z(t) on E, which has the Markov property. We do not have, however, that this law P µ 0 is the convex combination z∈E µ 0 (z)P δz , where δ z are Dirac masses. The existence of P µ 0 , on the pure jump trajectories, can be obtained by solving a martingale problem which is built with the intensity measure, m, defined as follows ∀i ∈ I:
for s ∈ [t, ∞), other terms being 0. This intensity measure satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2.1, page 216, of Stroock [9] . So, once we have solved the ODE system, for each initial condition µ 0 , we see that there exists a probability measure P µ 0 . The fact that this law is supported by the set of pure jump trajectories can be proved as in Lemma 1, page 588, of Sznitman [10] . It is such a description that we use below to obtain an expression for the intrinsic value associated to the state of an investor at each time. Using the properties of this expression we can then evaluate the directly negotiated prices among investors in our relatively opaque market. One can also consult Appendix I of Duffie [4] for a review of the basic theory of intensity-based models.
It is worth noticing that the laws P µ 0 can be obtained by a functional law of large numbers as in Ferland and Giroux [7] or by rewriting the system with the help of a single kernel and then using Theorem 1 of Bélanger and Giroux [1] .
Weill [12] proposed a similar system with the assumption that the eagerness is the same for all assets.
2.2. Partially segmented markets. In this class of models, buyers who do not hold an asset enter the market with a specific asset they want to purchase. Hence, the set of investors' type is given by
As before, the first letter designates the investor's intrinsic liquidity state and the second letter designates whether the investor owns the asset or not.
In this case, the eagerness' parametrization is the following: If an investor initially does not own any asset and is a low-type, the switching intensity of becoming a high-type is γ ui and it now depends on the asset type. If he initially does not own any asset but is a high-type, he will seek to buy a specific asset i and his switching intensity of becoming a low-type is γ di and it now also depends on the asset type. However, if an investor initially is owning that specific asset i and is a high-type (that is, he wants to keep his asset), the switching intensity of becoming a low-type is γ di . If he initially owns a specific asset i but is a low-type, the switching intensity of becoming a high-type is γ ui . In addition, investors meet each other at rate λ i , but an exchange of the asset occurs only if an investor of type (li, o) meets one of type (hi, n).
Hence, we have the following dynamical system of investors' type proportions measure µ t (z) for each z ∈ E, which consists of 3K + 1 equations with K + 1 constraints:
A schematic for the dynamics between investors for this class of models in a two assets-market (K = 2) is illustrated on Figure 2 .
Note that equation (9) of the previous system can be eliminated by adding each equation of (8) to (9) . Similarly, each equation of (10) can be eliminated by adding it to the corresponding equation of (11) . The system is then reduced to the following system of 2K equations:
The system (12) is our Master Equation and we define the intensity measure, m, as follows ∀i ∈ I:
for s ∈ [t, ∞), other terms being 0. Vayanos and Wang [11] proposed a similar two asset market.
3. The steady state of ODE systems. We have a steady state when the left hand side of our systems (5) and (12) are equal to zero. That is, when there is no longer dependence on time.
3.1. Non-segmented markets. Here, we need to solve the following system of equations:
First, note that we can eliminate µ(l, n) in (15) by using the constraint equation (7). Thus, (15) becomes
where γ γ d +γ u . Moreover, to simplify the last equation, we then substract the K equations of (16) to (17) to have
By using the constraint equation (6) to replace each µ(hi, o) in the last equation, we then have
where
Furthermore, each of the K equations in (16) gives us the identity
which can be substituted into (18) to have
Then, one need to solve F (x) = 0 for x µ(h, n). Hence we get µ(h, n) from which we get by (6) 
The challenge here is to solve for F (x) = 0. First, note that we have
So there is a positive root between 0 and 1 − i∈I m i which can always be calculated numerically. Thus, there always exist a stationary solution µ(h, n) for any K.
3.2.
Partially segmented markets. From our Master equation (12), we need to solve the following system of equations:
Using each of the constraint (23) and substituting them in each equation of (22) for µ(hi, o), we get
and thus
Now, subtracting each (22) to each (21) and using constraint (24) to substitute for µ(l, n), we get:
Using constraint (23) to substitute for µ(hi, o) and substituting (25) for µ(li, o), we finally get:
Hence, we have to solve a nonlinear system of K equations in K unknowns µ(hi, n). Once we have solved for µ(hi, n), we can get µ(li, o) by (25) and
, by (23), and that µ(l, n) = 1− i∈I m i − i∈I µ(hi, n), by (24).
Since the case K = 1 is the same whether the market is non-segmented or partially segmented, we have the result by the previuous subsection. We will prove the case K = 2 in the following subsection.
3.2.1. Special case of two assets. From (26) with i ∈ {1, 2}, we get the following system to solve:
or by rearanging terms:
Note that the first curve (27) passes through the following two points in the set {(x, y)}, with x µ(h1, n) and y µ(h2, n) :
By symmetry, we get that the second curve (28) passes through the points
and
> 1. Hence the two curves must meet in the positive unit square and we have a stationary law.
4. Asset pricing. Let C(t) denote the consumption process. Let U a utility function and r, the money market interest rate (which is assumed to be constant). As before, we also have Z(t), our non-homogeneous Markov chain describing investors' type (similarly to Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] ). We have the following infinite-horizon expected utility maximization problem:
where the wealth process {W (t), t ≥ 0} satisfy the following equation:
with W (0) = w 0 the initial wealth, P i (t) is the trade price between agents. θ i (t) is the ownership process for the i-th asset defined by
Note that dθ i (t) here is simply a shorthand for θ i (t+) − θ i (t−). Following Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] , we will assume for simplicity that investors are risk-neutral, that is we can let U (C(t)) = C(t). Hence, from (29), we define the following optimization problem:
subject to the budget equation
By (32) and (33), we can write
, by Itô's Lemma and thus
The intrinsic values V (t, z). We now want to calculate for each state z the intrinsic prices at time t
Let τ be the time of the first jump in the chain Z(t) after time t, so we can rewrite (35) as
By conditional iteration, the second term can be written as
In the next subsections, we present the intrinsic value for each state z ∈ E for the non-segmented and the partially segmented models. The details of calculation are in Appendix A.1.
4.1.1.
Intrinsic values for the non-segmented markets. The details of calculation for this class of models are in Appendix A.1.1. The results are: 
ODE's for V (t, z). As we want to compute the steady prices, we first need to compute the derivative of V (t, z) in time for each states z. We can note from the previous section that V (t, z) is always of the form
Explicit details of these calculations are presented in Appendix A.2.
4.2.1. ODE's for V (t, z) for the non-segmented markets. The details of calculation for this class of models are in Appendix A.2.1. The results are:
ODE's for V (t, z) for the partially segmented markets. The details of calculation for this class of models are in Appendix A.2.2. The results are:
Equilibrium intrinsic values and prices. The equilibrium intrinsic value are computed by putting ∂ ∂t V (t, z) V (z) = 0 for each state z ∈ E.
4.3.1. Equilibrium prices for the non-segmented markets. From the four equations (44), (45), (46) and (47), we get the following system:
Rewriting this system, we get
Written in a similar manner as the system A5 in Appendix of Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] , but without marketmakers (ρ = 0), we have the following generalized system:
Now, to find the price P i , we first rewrite the system in terms of the reservation prices for buyers
where q ∈ [0, 1] represents the bargaining power of agents and is assumed to be the same for each asset i ∈ I. Then,
and ∆ e V (h, n) − V (l, n) and rewrite the system:
which is a linear system of 2K + 2 equations in 2K + 2 unknowns. If we define the vectors
it gives us the following system to solve (which is similar to the system A7 in Appendix of Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] ):
where M is a (2K + 2) × (2K + 2) coefficient matrix defined in Appendix B.1. If M is invertible, we can solve this system by computing ∆ = M −1 δ and then compute asset's price using (52).
4.3.2.
Equilibrium prices for the partially segmented markets. Thus, from the four equations (48), (49), (50) and (51) ofV (t, z), it gives us the following system:
By rewriting this system, we have
where q ∈ [0, 1] represents the bargaining power of agents and is assumed to be the same for each asset i ∈ I. Then, we have
Define ∆ 0 V (l, n) and ∆ e i V (hi, n) − V (l, n) and rewrite the system:
which is a linear system of 3K + 1 equations in 3K + 1 unknowns. If we define the vectors
it gives us the following system to solve:
where M is a (3K + 1) × (3K + 1) matrix defined in Appendix B.2.
If M is invertible, we can solve this system by computing ∆ = M −1 δ and then compute asset's prices using (56).
5.
Numerical examples for markets with two assets. This section contains a few numerical results for our two classes of models. We present these examples primarily for an illustrative purpose.
We will use (and modify) the parameters used in Duffie [5] . We also refer to the reader to this book for the empirical justification of these parameters. That is, we assumed that γ u1 = γ u2 = γ u = 5 and γ d1 = γ d2 = γ d = 0.5 for the non-segmented class, and γ u1 = γ u1 = γ u2 = γ u2 = 5 and γ d1 = γ d1 = γ d2 = γ d2 = 0.5 for the segmented class. We moreover assumed that λ 1 = λ 2 = 1250. For comparison purpose we split in two Duffie's value of m = 0.8 and use m 1 = m 2 = 0.4.
We can see in Table 1 , for the non-segmented class, under these parameters, µ(l1, o) = µ(l2, o) = µ(l, o)/2 and µ(h1, o) = µ(h2, o) = µ(h, o)/2, where µ(l, o) and µ(h, o) are the steady states for Duffie's one-asset market. Note also that the prices are identical and equal to the price obtained in Duffie [5] . The steady state proportions are different for the partially segmented market because the expected return times of the states are different. For example, it is shorter to return to (li, o) because γ u1 + γ u2 > γ u so µ(li, o), equal to the reciprocal of that expected return time, is greater than in the non-segmented market. Conversely, we get a smaller µ(hi, o) because of the longer cycle in the chain that passes through (hj, o), j = i. In turn, the misallocation of assets, (li, o), decreases slightly the steady state price (see previous scheme on Figure 2 ).
We now turn our attention to the sensitivity of prices with respect to λ. We still assume that λ 1 = λ 2 = λ. We can see generally that the price will tend to the perfect market price (1/r = 20) when frictions diminish, i.e. when λ → ∞. The prices of the second asset in the partially segmented market exhibit a different behavior though. Its parameters γ d2 and γ u2 were doubled (see Figure 3 ). 
5 with γ u2 = 2γ u1 and γ d2 = 2γ d1 .
6. Asymptotic stability. We analyse the asymptotic stability of our ODE's systems by computing the characteristic polynomial of their Jacobian. If we can prove that all eigenvalues have negative real parts, then we have asymptotic stability (see Braun [2] ). We do it directly, in a manner similar to that of Weill [12] for the non-segmented markets with any given number of assets. Thus, it gives us, in particular, the asymptotic stability for partially segmented markets with one asset. In order to prove the asymptotic stability for partially segmented markets with two assets, we resort to the Routh-Hurwitz criterion which gives specific conditions on the coefficients of a polynomial to ensure that the real part of all its root are negative (see Dorf and Bishop [3] ).
As mentioned before, our limitation in this latter case comes from the fact that the Routh-Hurwitz stability criterion gets very steeply harder to verify as we increase the number of assets.
Because the Jacobian calculations involves a linear approximation of our systems close to its steady state, we prove in fact local stability. That is, we have asymptotic stability of our systems for a subset of initial laws µ 0 close to the steady state. Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen [6] prove, more generally, the stability of their system for any initial law µ 0 . Their technique relies on the fact that they have a single asset and their assumption on investors' eagerness.
To simplify notations in the following subsections, we define γ i γ ui + γ di , γ i γ ui + γ di and γ γ u + γ d . Moreover, let ξ ∈ C denote the eigenvalue of the following characteristic polynomial of each system's Jacobian matrix.
6.1. Non-segmented markets. For this class of models, we will prove the system's stability for any K assets by showing directly that all eigenvalues of the Jacobian have negative real parts.
Let
and v µ t (h, n). Then, by substituting constraint (7) for µ t (l, n) and constraints (6) for each µ t (hi, o), we can rewrite the system (5) as:
. . .
We compute the following Jacobian matrix of the system at its steady state:
Let e (1) 2K+1×1 and let ξ ∈ C be the eigenvalue for J associated with the eigenvector y = (y 1 , y 2 ) , where y 1 = (y 11 , y 22 , ..., y 2K ) and y 2 ∈ R. Then we have:
The inner product of e with (60) gives
If we expand (61), we get
Thus, subtracting (63) to (62), we get
In this case, we must have Re(ξ) < 0 and the system is asymptotically stable.
Case y 2 = 0: We can suppose without loss of generality that y 2 = 1. So,
Then (60) becomes
It implies that:
there exists i 0 such that
Then we see that
Thus, the system is asymptotically stable for any number of assets.
6.2. Partially segmented markets. Because the partially segmented and the non-segmented markets are equivalent for one asset, the stability for one asset in this case is already proved. So we will verify it for the case K = 2.
Let x µ t (h1, n), y µ t (h2, n), z µ t (l1, o) and v µ t (l2, o). Then, as before, we can rewrite the system as:
where:
We can readily see that a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 > 0. We need furthermore to check that a 1 a 2 a 3 − a 2 3 − a 2 1 a 4 > 0 in order to satisfy the Routh-Hurwitz criterion which enables us to conclude that the system is stable. This last step is done using Mathematica. We expand the algebraic expression a 1 a 2 a 3 − a 2 3 − a 2 1 a 4 and then simplify it to see that the result is a (very long) multiplication and addition of positive numbers. This shows, by Routh-Hurwitz, that the real parts of all eigenvalues are strictly negative ensuring the asymptotic stability of the system. Intrinsic values V (t, z) .
A.1.1. Intrinsic values for the non-segmented markets. For the non-segmented markets, we have: Case z = (l, n): In this case, the only jump possible is towards the state (h, n) with a time τ = τ h , where τ h − t ∼ E(γ u ). Then, for t ≤ v ≤ τ , from (31) and (34), we have θ i (v) = 0, ∀i ∈ I, which implies that dA(v) = 0 and
The next jump will be towards (l, n) or (hi, o), for any i ∈ I. Since the investor automatically buys the first available asset, we have τ = min{τ l , τ hi : i ∈ I} the time until the next jump, where τ l − t ∼ E(γ d ) but, for each i, τ hi has a jump intensity λ i µ t (li, o) and the following probability distribution(see Lemma 1 of Sznitman [10] ):
In this case, for t ≤ v < τ , we have θ i (v) = 0 and dA(v) = 0, but for v = τ , we have
We now compute the intrinsic value as follows:
Because we know the full intensity measure, we have that the densities are
Since the probabilities in the integrals are
The only jump possible is towards (li, o) with a time τ = τ l , where τ l − t ∼ E(γ di ). In this case, for t ≤ v ≤ τ , we have θ i (v) = 1 and dA(v) = δ hi dv, so
The next jump will be towards (l, n) or (hi, o), for some i ∈ I. Thus, we have τ = min{τ l , τ hi } the time until the next jump, where τ hi − t ∼ E(γ ui ), but τ l has a jump intensity λ i µ t (h, n) and the following probability distribution (see Lemma 1 of Sznitman [10] ):
In this case, for t ≤ v ≤ τ , we have θ i (v) = 1 and dA(v) = (δ hi − δ di )dv, but for v = τ , we have
and thus, by knowing the density f τ (s) ≡ f min{τ l ,τ hi } (s), we have
Intrinsic values for the partially segmented markets. For the segmented markets, we have: Case z = (l, n): The next jump will be towards (hi, n) for any i ∈ I. Thus, we have τ = min{τ hi : i ∈ I}, the time until the next jump to the state (hi, n), where τ hi − t ∼ E( γ ui ) independently. Then, we have θ i (v) = 0 and dA(v) = 0, ∀t ≤ v ≤ τ , and thus
The next jump will be towards (l, n) or (hi, o), for some i ∈ I. Thus, we have τ = min{τ l , τ hi }, the time until the next jump, where τ l − t ∼ E( γ di ) but τ hi has a jump intensity λ i µ t (li, o) with the following probability distribution (see Lemma 1 of Sznitman [10] ):
Case z = (hi, o): In this case, the intrinsic value calculation details are identical to the case z = (hi, o) in the partially segmented market.
The next jump will be towards (l, n) or (hi, o). Thus, we have τ = min{τ l , τ hi } the time until the next jump, where τ hi −t ∼ E(γ ui ) but τ l has a jump intensity λ i µ t (hi, n) and the following probability distribution (see Lemma 1 of Sznitman [10] ):
The remaining intrinsic value calculation details are very similar to the case z = (li, o) in the partially segmented market.
A.2. ODE's for V (t, z).
A.2.1. ODE's for V (t, z) for the non-segmented markets. For the nonsegmented markets, we have: Case z = (l, n): In this case, m = 1 and we have
By (36), we then havė
Case z = (h, n): In this case, m = 2 and we have
and theṅ n) ; t, t) n) ; t, s)ds
By (37),
In this case, m = 2 and we have − λ i µ t (h, n)(V (t, (l, n)) + P i (t)) − (δ hi − δ di ) A.2.2. ODE's for V (t, z) for the partially segmented markets. For the segmented markets, we have: Case z = (l, n): In this case, m = 1 and we have g 1 ((l, n); t, s) = i∈I V (s, (hi, n)) γ ui exp − r + i∈I γ ui (s − t) Since ∂ ∂t g 1 ((l, n); t, s) = r + i∈I γ ui g 1 ((l, n); t, s), theṅ V (t, (l, n)) = −g 1 ((l, n); t, t) + ∞ t r + i∈I γ ui g 1 ((l, n); t, s)ds = − i∈I V (t, (hi, n)) γ ui + r + i∈I γ ui ∞ t g 1 ((l, n); t, s)ds By (41), we then havė V (t, (l, n)) = − i∈I V (t, (hi, n)) γ ui + r + The (3K + 1) × (3K + 1) coefficients matrix in this case is defined as follows: 
where γ i γ ui + γ di , Ψ ui γ ui + λ i µ(hi, n)q, Ψ di γ di + M i and M i λ i µ(li, o)(1 − q).
